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Abstract 
Using the results of seven nationally and regionally representative household surveys, this study 
analyzes the impact of trade liberalization on wage inequality through a channel in which applied 
tariffs, owing to the preferential margin given under numerous preferential trade agreements, would 
affect industry wage premiums during the 1992–2006 period in Chile. I find the skill premiums for 
high-skilled workers there to have decreased, especially after 2000; this circumstance is unlike that 
seen in most other Latin American countries or during Chile’s initial reform period. The results of 
econometric analyses show that industries which experienced larger tariff reductions were those with 
initially higher shares of low-skilled workers and lower industry wage premiums, and a statistically 
significant negative relationship between applied tariffs and industry wage premiums, that is, tariff  
reductions contributed to an increase in initially lower industry wage premiums. However, the impacts 
of applied tariffs on industry wage premiums disappear, after controlling for unobservable time-
invariant industry characteristics during the 2000–2006 period. Thus, I find no statistically significant 
relationship between applied tariffs and industry wage premiums. The findings suggest that, unlike a 
theoretical assumption that tariff reduction-induced productivity improvements lead to increases in 
industry wage premiums, industries with initially higher productivity tend to have lower applied tariffs 
and higher wage premiums in such a short time-period. Therefore, I cannot conclude that bi- or 
multilateral trade liberalization during this period has contributed to wage equalization through a 
channel in which applied tariffs affect industry wage premiums. 
JEL classifications: F15, F16, and O15. 
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Introduction 
A number of previous studies have attempted to econometrically analyze the impacts of trade 
liberalization on wage distribution in Latin American countries (henceforth LACs). Many of the 
findings of those studies, whether based on country-specific or cross-country evidence, suggest that 
trade liberalization has adverse effects on wage distribution, except in a few cases.1 
In order to explain the findings, which seem to contradict the traditional assumption inherent 
in Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson theory, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) provide comprehensive 
discussion based on an abundant body of empirical research. In summarizing the main points of 
discussion, two main explanations are provided. The first line of explanation for those findings 
focuses on between-industry changes. Those studies note that, contrary to expectations, unskilled 
labor-intensive sectors were in fact protected the most, prior to trade liberalization, and that they 
experienced the largest tariff reductions during trade liberalization. Therefore, the rise in wage 
inequality is exactly what Stolper-Samuelson would predict. On the other hand, the second line of 
explanation focuses on within-industry changes. According to those studies, one of the main factors 
contributing to the rise in wage inequality is an increase in demand for more skilled workers within 
industries, that is, skill-biased technological change (henceforth SBTC). This increase was caused by 
an increase in cheaper imports of capital goods that are complementary to skilled workers and 
defensive innovation caused by intensified competition from abroad after trade liberalization. 
From this viewpoint, the experiences of Chile since the 1990s provide a very interesting case. 
First, during the 1990–2006 period, Chile —the first of the LACs to introduce a free-market 
strategy— had already implemented main economic reforms and its economic situation was relatively 
stable, unlike those of other LACs. Especially, Chile continued with trade liberalization via the 
enforcement of preferential trade agreements (henceforth PTAs) in this period, which will be 
discussed in greater detail in the second section. Second, Chile has succeeded in expanding 
nontraditional natural resource-based exports (e.g., fruit, forestry, fisheries), and so Chile has been the 
most successful LAC in terms of export-led growth. 
Concerning the analytical methodology, we explore a variety of possible approaches to identify 
the impacts of trade liberalization on wage inequality. This study uses tariffs as measures of trade 
liberalization and analyzes the impacts of trade liberalization on wage inequality, through a channel in 
which tariffs would affect industry wage premiums, defined “as the part of worker wages that cannot be 
                                                        
1
 Concerning the specific-country evidence of Latin American countries, Giordano and Florez (2009) summarize the 
methods and results of each study. 
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explained by observable workers’ characteristics, but can be attributed to workers’ industry affiliations” 
(Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007: 70); they can also be interpreted as the relative wage of each industry after 
controlling for observable workers’ characteristics.  Focusing on industry wage premiums allows us to 
show, quite clearly, the impacts of tariffs on wage inequality; different industries employ different 
proportions of skilled and unskilled workers, and the extent of tariff reductions will differ by industry. 
Thus, under the assumption that there is a lack of labor mobility, changes in industry wage premiums 
would translate into changes in the relative incomes of skilled and unskilled workers (Pavcnik et al. 
2004; Perry and Olarreaga 2006). Therefore, the objective of this study is to analyze empirically 
whether trade liberalization in Chile has produced a distributional impact during a period in which the 
country had implemented important economic reforms and has continued with its sustained open 
economy strategy, focusing on industry wage premiums. For this purpose, this study takes advantage 
of data obtained through a series of comprehensive nationally representative household surveys, 
Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (henceforth CASEN); it also makes use of 
applied tariff rates, which are actually applied to imports as a part of PTA enforcement. 
This paper is organized as follows. The first section reviews previous studies. The second 
section overviews the main feature of trade policy during the period in question. The third section 
describes the data and estimates skill premiums as measures of wage inequality, as well as industry 
wage premiums, in the first-stage estimation. The fourth section econometrically analyzes the 
relationship between tariffs and industry wage premiums in the second-stage estimation. The 
conclusions are summarized in the final section. 
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I. Literature review 
Although the experiences of Chile provide a very interesting case —in that Chile was the first country 
to introduce trade liberalization and is the most successful case of export-led growth strategy among 
the LACs—, very few studies deal with the topic of trade liberalization in Chile. Beyer et al. (1999), 
the most frequently cited study on this topic in Chile, find that trade liberalization, measured as the 
volume of trade over GDP, widened the gap of wage premiums between skilled and unskilled labor 
during the 1960–1996 period. They argue that SBTC and the relative increase in demand for skilled 
labor in natural resource-based export sectors 2  following trade liberalization are the two main 
explanations for the results.  Robbins (1994) analyzes the same household surveys used by Beyer et al. 
(1999), from 1957 to 1992, and finds that between-industry changes are weak and attributes the 
increase in wage inequality to within-demand changes favoring skilled workers, that is, SBTC after 
trade liberalization. Meller and Tokman (1996) analyze manufacturing sectors from 1968 to 1993 and 
find the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers —which is assumed to be a proxy variable for 
technology, that is, demand for skilled workers within industries— widened the gap between the 
relative wages of skilled and unskilled workers; thus, SBTC increased wage inequality. However, 
unlike other studies, they find the share to have a smaller effect on the relative wage since post-1975 
trade liberalization. 
Additionally, a few studies focus on the relationship among trade policy variables such as tariffs 
and industry wage premiums (Pavcnik et al. 2004). Feliciano (2001) analyzes the case of Mexico from 
1986 to 1990, and finds that although there is no statistically significant relationship between tariffs and 
industry wage premiums, there is a statistically significant positive relationship between import licenses 
and industry wage premiums; she also finds that import-license coverage decreased the most in 
industries with the highest share of low-skilled workers. Thus, she asserts, trade liberalization could 
contribute to increases in wage inequality. Attanasio et al. (2004) analyze the case of Colombia from 
1984 to 1998, and they find a statistically significant positive relationship between tariff reductions and 
declines in industry wage premiums; they also find that industries that experienced the largest tariff 
reductions were also those with the initially highest shares of unskilled workers and lowest wages. Thus, 
they too assert that trade liberalization could contribute to increases in wage inequality. Finally, Pavcnik 
et al. (2004) analyze the case of Brazil from 1987 to 1998, and they find that there is no statistically 
significant relationship between tariffs and industry wage premiums; thus, they say, there is no evidence 
that trade liberalization contributes to increases in wage inequality. 
                                                        
2
  They define “natural resources” as both mining and other nontraditional ones, for example, fruit and pulpwood.  
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However, all the aforementioned studies in the Chilean case only mainly cover the initial 
reform period, cover only urban areas or manufacturing sectors, and they use trade volumes as 
measures of trade liberalization. However, especially when one considers the specific Chilean context, 
trade volume has crucial flaws as a measure of trade liberalization. This is because the exports of 
Chile still heavily depend on a limited number of commodities, including copper, and thus trade 
volumes can be almost determined by copper price and the real exchange rate, neither of which are 
related to trade policy in itself. In fact, during the 1974–1996 period, the correlation coefficient 
between trade volumes and the real effective exchange rate was very high: 0.87.  
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II. Trade policy in Chile, 1992–2006: from 
“unilateral” to “reciprocal” trade liberalization 
Chile started initiating drastic economic reforms in 1975, following the military coup d’état that 
overthrew Allende’s government in 1973. Pinochet’s government replaced the formerly inward-
looking development strategy with an outward-looking one. At the end of Allende’s administration, 
tariffs levied in each industrial sector varied widely, from 0% to 750%; the average tariff was 94%. 
The trade policy introduced by Pinochet’s government bore the following characteristics. NTBs such 
as import quotas and permits were almost completely eliminated, and tariffs were progressively 
reduced and their dispersions decreased, so that by 1979 a flat tariff applied to most goods (Macario, 
2000). The average tariff between 1979 and 1982 was 10.1% (Ffrench-Davis, Leiva and Madrid, 
1992). Although tariffs were raised owing to the economic crisis between 1983 and 1985, tariff levels 
were again progressively reduced as the economy recovered post-1986.3 
The economic administration of the center-left coalition government that took office in 1990 
maintained the basic trade-policy principles of the former government, for example, an export-led 
growth strategy, openness to trade, further uniform tariff reduction, and intersectoral neutrality.4 
Therefore, Chile consolidated within the World Trade Organization a maximum tariff rate of 25%, 
bringing it down from 35% (Macario, 2000); meanwhile, the tariff rate of the most-favored nation 
(MFN) was progressively reduced from 11% in 1992 to 10% in 1999, 9% in 2000, 8% in 2001, 7% in 
2002, and 6% in 2004.5 
The most important feature of Chile’s trade policy after the 1990s was in how it moved from 
unilateral, across-the-board liberalization toward a strategy that also included bi- or multilateral PTAs 
subject to reciprocal trade liberalization (Ffrench-Davis, 2010). Since the early 1990s, Chile has 
actively pursued PTA negotiations; most of the PTAs signed during that period fall into a category 
known as Economic Complementation Agreements (ECAs), which focus on the elimination of tariffs 
and NTBs for goods (Kuwayama, 2003). By 2006, Chile had executed ECAs with Mexico (1992), 
Venezuela (1993), Bolivia (1993), Colombia (1994), Ecuador (1995), and Peru (1998).6 Moreover, 
since the mid-1990s, Chile has pursued a more comprehensive PTA style —that is, NAFTA-style 
                                                        
3
 The average tariff from 1983 to 1985 was 22.7%; from 1986 to 1989, it was 17.6%. Data are obtained from 
Ffrench-Davis (2002). 
4
 Concerning trade policy since 1990, see for more details Ffrench-Davis (2008; 2010). 
5
 Data are obtained from World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). 
6
 See, for more details: http://www.sice.oas.org/agreements_e.asp and Kuwayama (2003). 
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agreements or Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), which not only have faster and more universal tariff 
phase-out programs, but also include those areas not addressed by ECAs, such as investment, trade in 
services, competition policy, government procurement, and intellectual property rights (Kuwayama 
2003). By 2006, Chile had executed FTAs of this type with MERCOSUR (1996), Canada (1997), 
Mexico (1999), Costa Rica (2002), El Salvador (2002), the European Union (2003), the United States 
of America (2004), the Republic of Korea (2004), the European Free Trade Association (2004), and 
China (2006); the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement among Chile, New 
Zealand, Singapore, and Brunei Darussalam (2006) also falls into this category.7 
As a result of these agreements, the share of import values from countries with which Chile 
has PTAs has drastically increased. As shown in Table 1, the share increased from 2% in 1992 to 85% 
in 2006. Furthermore, the import-weighted average applied tariffs8 (henceforth, applied tariffs) levied 
in each industrial sector diverged from the MFN tariffs, owing to the preferential margin given under 
numerous PTAs and the many exceptions allowed by tariff phase-out programs.9  This study attempts 
to use tariffs as measures of trade liberalization by employing applied tariffs. Additionally, what is 
relevant from the viewpoint of the impacts of trade liberalization on wage inequality is that applied 
tariffs not only lead to reductions in import tariffs but also prevent trade partners from arbitrarily 
increasing tariffs on Chilean exports; thus, applied tariffs ensure strong access conditions and stability 
for Chilean exports, both of which are afforded by the PTAs’ principle of reciprocity.10 
However, it is very difficult to calculate applied tariffs, given the many kinds of exceptions 
allowed by tariff phase-out programs, especially with respect to agricultural products (e.g., beef, sugar, 
wheat, wheat flour), 11 although some attempts have certainly been made to calculate them. Although 
Becerra (2006) provides a thorough calculation, it covers only the 2000–2005 period. Dúran (2008) 
covers the 1990–2007 period, but only calculates a proxy for applied tariffs (arancel efectivo), and thus 
assumes them to be equal to 0 on all products after any kind of PTA came into effect. Therefore, Dúran’s 
(2008) assumption may be too strong and unrealistic, if they are to be used in actual empirical analyses. 
World Integrated Trade Solution (henceforth WITS) also provides a thorough calculation and defines the 
applied tariff as the minimum tariff granted by a reporter country to a partner for the product in question; 
it is equal to the MFN tariff, unless a preferential tariff exists in the database. However, the data 
apparently do not reflect the realities of applied tariffs. For example, all applied tariffs levied in each 
industrial sector in 2000 are at the homogenous rate of 9%, that is, they are identical to MFN tariff rates, 
although many PTAs had already come into effect in that year. 
In summary, data from Becerra (2006) can be considered the only data available for empirical 
analyses. In fact, Ffrench-Davis (2008), one of the most widely accepted studies on the Chilean 
economy, uses data from Becerra (2006) vis-à-vis applied tariffs. However, in addition to covering a 
limited time-period, the classifications in Becerra’s data do not necessarily coincide with the general 
industrial classification of economic activities, for example, the international standard industrial 
classification (ISIC). Some sectors are classified according to the 2-digit ISIC level (Rev.2), others are 
classified according to the 3-digit ISIC level (Rev.2), and still others are classified according to an 
                                                        
7
  See, for more details: http://www.sice.oas.org/agreements_e.asp and Kuwayama (2003). 
8
  If Chile imports a good i from China, with which Chile has no kind of PTA, and the United States of America 














×+×= τττ , 
where iM is the total import value of good i from a country. 
9
  This is also pointed out by Macario (2000). 
10
  For more details, see Sáez and Valdés (1999). 
11
  For example, in the agreements between Chile and MERCOSUR, Chile includes some traditional agricultural products 
as the most restricted categories: they receive duty-free treatment after 15 and 18 years, respectively (Agosin, 1999). 
For a list of the exceptions due to tariff phase-out programs in 2004, see Schuschny et al. (2007). 
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aggregated 2 or 3-digit ISIC level (Rev.2), that is, aggregation of some 2 or 3-digit level sectors into 
one sector (see Table 2). Therefore, I reconstruct household surveys, as explained in greater detail in 
the next section, according to Becerra’s (2006) own classification, and I apply this classification to the 
tradable sectors addressed in this study. 
Table 2 shows the average applied tariffs according to this classification between Q2 2000 
and Q4 2005, inclusive.12 This table shows some noticeable trends. First, in the initial 2000 time 
period, applied tariffs were the highest in the agricultural (ISIC 11) and agricultural-based 
manufacturing (ISIC 311/312) sectors, both of which had many exceptions allowed by tariff phase-out 
programs. Second, applied tariffs levied in each industrial sector including the agricultural and 
agricultural-based manufacturing sectors drastically decreased after 2000. After that time, many 
important FTAs with quicker tariff phase-out programs came into effect, and most of the ECAs had 
already been in effect for 10 years. Therefore, the applied tariffs in 2006 nearly equal 0% in most of 
the industrial sectors. 
 
TABLE 1 
SHARE OF IMPORT VALUES FROM COUNTRIES  
WITH WHICH CHILE HAS PTAS, 1992–2006 
Year 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 2006 
PTA’s share (%) 1.93 4.99 27.28 30.70 34.58 62.97 84.50 
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from WITS, http://www.sice. 




APPLIED TARIFFS, 2000–2005 
(Percentages) 
ISIC (Rev.2) Industry Q2 2000 Q2 2003 Q4 2005 
11 Agriculture and hunting 13.91 2.29 1.03 
12 Forestry and logging 4.63 1.98 0.70 
13 Fishing 9.01 5.40 2.34 
21/22 Coal mining / Crude petroleum and natural 
gas production 
4.88 1.37 2.47 
23/29 Metal ore mining / Other mining 3.98 1.20 0.13 
311/312 Food manufacture 13.10 3.50 2.61 
313/314 Beverage industries / Tobacco manufacture 6.12 3.68 1.94 
321/322 Manufacture of textiles / Manufacture of 
wearing apparel, except footwear 
7.71 4.60 4.33 
323/324 Manufacture of leather and products of 
leather / Manufacture of footwear 
7.79 4.33 5.09 
331 Manufacture of Wood and Wood and cork 
products 
7.22 1.53 0.96 
332 Manufacture of furniture and fixtures 7.01 3.94 3.78 
341 Manufacture of paper and paper products 5.58 1.22 0.39 
342 Printing, publishing and allied industries 2.53 1.51 1.14 
351 Manufacture of industrial chemicals 5.80 2.89 1.38 
352 Manufacture of other chemical products 6.90 3.21 2.01 
(continues) 
 
                                                        
12
  There is a reason as to why I use data from Q2 2000 as initial tariff rates, to perform a Durbin–Wu–Hausman test 
for the endogeneity of applied tariffs; this is discussed in detail in the fourth section. 
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Table 2 (concluded) 
ISIC (Rev.2) Industry Q2 2000 Q2 2003 Q4 2005 
353/354/355/356 Petroleum refineries / Manufacture of 
miscellaneous products of petroleum / 
Manufacture of rubber products / 
Manufacture of plastic products 
7.51 3.54 1.57 
36 Manufacture of nonmetallic mineral 
products, except products of petroleum and 
coal 
6.67 3.08 2.23 
37 Basic metal industries 4.81 2.21 1.04 
381/383/385 Manufacture of fabricated mital products, 
except pfoducts of petroleum and coal 
7.39 3.36 2.57 
382 Manufacture of machinery expect electrical 5.97 2.26 1.08 
384 Manufacture of transport equipment 6.83 2.89 1.40 
39 Other manufacture industries 8.15 4.94 4.79 
MFNa  9.00 6.00 6.00 
Source: Becerra (2006: 21-26)b 
a
 MFN stands for Most Favoured Nation. 
b
 The sector names were originally written in Spanish, and the ISIC codes are explicity written up to the 
2-digit level. I use the name of eache sector to match Becerra’s (2006) own classification to the general 
ISIC code, which is as detailed as possible, for example up to the 3-digit level. I refer to the United 
Nation’s webpage (http://unstarts.un.org/unsd/cr /registry/) for Spanish to English translations. 
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III. Wage premiums in Chile, 1992–2006  
(first-stage estimation) 
A. Data used 
I use data from seven comprehensive household surveys: CASEN, from the years 1992, 1994, 1996, 
1998, 2000, 2003, and 2006.13 Each is a nationally and regionally representative household survey 
carried out by MIDEPLAN (Ministerio de Planificacion y Cooperación).14 The objectives of the 
survey are to generate a reliable portrait of socioeconomic conditions across the country and to 
monitor the incidence and effectiveness of the government’s social programs (Valdés, 1999);15 it is 
carried out in November of each year. Therefore, the survey provides detailed information on 
demographic characteristics, education, health, housing, employment, and various sources of income, 
including income transfers and government subsidies. The data is a repeated cross-section, and the 
sample size of each year is substantially large: each survey covers between 130,000 and 270,000 
individuals, from between 33,000 and 74,000 households. As such, the data are available in two 
forms: individual and household levels; for the purpose of this study, I use the latter. The survey is 
unique, in that the employment data are reported at the 3-digit ISIC level (Rev.2) from 1992 to 1996, 
while data are provided at the 4-digit level from 1998 to 2006.16 
I define “wages” as the sum of disposable income after tax from paid employment, that is, 
wage income and bonuses from principal occupation.17 Therefore, they do not include income from 
other occupations, self-employment, asset income, income transfers, or subsidies. The samples used in 
this study are defined as comprising the population of working age (aged 14–65 years) who report 
positive income and positive work hours. The sample includes only salaried workers; thus, self-
                                                        
13
  Although the year 1990 is also available, the classification of economic activity in this year is different from that of 
the others, and it is not consistent with any international classification. Therefore, we do not use data from this year. 
14
  Each survey is carried out by MIDEPLAN through the Department of Economics of the University of Chile. Once 
each survey is complete, the data are entrusted to ECLAC, which is in a position to evaluate the consistency of the 
information and generate a series of new variables that are compatible with other LACs (Valdés, 1999). 
15
  For more details, see: http://www.mideplan.cl/casen/en/descripcion.html. 
16
  In the 1990s, household surveys in LACs were far less internationally standardized than today. For this reason, the 
lack of an international framework vis-à-vis the concepts and classifications used in surveys is rather common. 
17
  Although I want to set aside income derived solely from principal employment, in CASEN 2006, we cannot 
distinguish income from bonuses.  
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employed —employers and independent workers— are not included.18 Military personnel and unpaid 
family workers are also excluded from the sample, because their wages are not likely to be determined 
by market forces. The samples whose variables had not been answered at least one survey question are 
also eliminated. 
For the 1992–1994 period, I construct hourly wages by dividing monthly wages by four 
weeks of working hours, owing to the unavailability of monthly working-hour figures during this 
period. Wages are deflated by the national consumer price index (December 2008 = 1). 
B. Skill premiums 
In this section, I estimate the narrowest measure of inequality —skill premiums.19 This study defines 
the skill premiums as the returns to different levels of school attainment, after controlling for various 
observable individual characteristics. To estimate skill premiums, we define three educational 
categories: (1) low-skilled workers, who comprise workers who had completed up to elementary 
school education, (2) medium-skilled workers, who comprise workers who had not completed Centro 
de Formación Técnica (CFT) or Instituto Profesional (IP)-based education, as well as secondary 
school graduates or those workers who had not completed secondary school education, and (3) high-
skilled workers, who comprise university graduates or those workers who had not completed a 
university education, and CFT or IP-based education graduates. The high-skill premiums are 
estimated as the returns to high-skilled workers relative to those for low-skilled workers, while 
medium-skill premiums are estimated as the returns to medium-skilled workers relative to those for 
low-skilled workers. These premiums are estimated in each year of the 1992–2006 period by using a 
Mincerian wage equation (1). 
Figure 1 shows the evolution in the level of education attainment during the 1992–2006 
period. What is evident from these descriptive statistics is that the share of low-skilled workers 
decreased from 37.2% in 1992 to 26.3% in 2000, while the share of high-skilled workers increased 
from 15.1% to 21.8% and that of medium-skilled workers remained relatively stable (about 50%). 
However, after 2000, the share of low-skilled workers slightly decreased —from 26.3% to 23.3% in 
2006— while the share of medium skilled workers slightly increased from 50.5% to 53.1% in 2006 
and that of high-skilled workers remained stable (23%). 
 
  
                                                        
18
  We cannot know the working hours of self-employed in 2006, because in this year the questions were asked only of 
salaried workers. 
19
  The validity of the most frequently used inequality indices such as the Gini coefficient or coefficient of variation, 
especially over longer periods of time, has been questioned recently, because coverage of income sources and taxes 
tends to vary, and higher-income households tend to be truncated. Therefore, to avoid these problems, many studies 
have focused on the narrowest measure of inequality, that is, skill premiums (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007). 
However, even skill premiums are not immune to the aforementioned second problem, because very high wages 
can be also truncated, although wage incomes tend to be more equal than asset incomes. However, I use skill 
premiums as the measure of inequality, because the increase in inequality documented in many developing 
countries has been associated with an increase in skill premiums (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007). 
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FIGURE 1 
EVOLUTION OF EDUCATION ATTAINMENT, 1992–2006 
 
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from CASEN  
Note: The calculated values are weighted using sample weights. 
 
 
The wage-equation specification to be estimated is as follows: 
ijjijijijijijijij ewpIXhskilledmskilledconsW ++′+++++= *expexpln
2
4321 βββββ  (1) 
 
where i and j indexes individual and industry, respectively; w is hourly wage; mskilled is a 
dummy variable with a value of 1 for individuals who fall into the medium-skilled workers-category; 
hskilled is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for individuals who fall into the high-skilled workers 
category; and exp is potential labor experience (age —years of schooling— 6). The vector X contains 
demography dummies, a part-time dummy that has a value of 1 for workers working fewer than 40 
h/week, an informal dummy that has a value of 1 for workers working without any kind of contract, 3 
workplace characteristics dummies,20 8 occupational dummies,21 and 25 region dummies.22 A set of 
industry indicators (I) reflect worker i’s industry affiliation23 (see Table 3). 
The results from equation (1) are reported in Table 3. The most striking finding from this 
wage equation is a decreasing trend in the skill premiums for high-skilled workers, while skill 
premiums for medium-skilled workers remained stable.24   While the high-skilled workers earned 
87.6% more than their low-skilled counterparts in 1992, that difference declined to 58.2% in 2006;25 
thus, wage inequality —that is, wage gaps between high-skilled and low-skilled workers, after 
                                                        
20
  This classification is based on Infante and Sunkel (2009). They consider establishments with fewer than nine 
people to be in low-productivity sectors. Establishments with one to five people are chosen as the base category.  
21
  Unskilled workers are chosen as the base category. Unskilled workers (originally trabajadores no calificados) is another 
category different from low-skilled workers, who are categorized according to level of education attainment. 
22
  Chile has 13 regions, each of which is classified into urban and rural areas. The urban area of the Metropolitan 
Region (Santiago) is chosen as the base category, because it absorbs the largest percentage of the population. 
23
  The industry indicators are classified according to Becerra (2006) in tradable sectors and according to the 2-digit 
ISIC level (Rev.2) in nontradable sectors. Construction (ISIC code 50) is chosen as the base category, because it 
holds the largest employment share among all nontradable sectors. 
24
  A possible concern with this estimation is that the level of education attainment correlates with unobservable 
variables, such as individual specific ability. Although this problem persists, it is unlikely that the impacts of 
unobservable variables on the level of education attainment substantially changed during the 1992–2006 period.  
25
  As Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) point out, the coefficient of dummy variable (C) in semi-logarithmic 
regressions like in equation (1) needs to be interpreted carefully. Not C but exp(C)-1 shows the effect of this 
dummy being equal to 1 on a dependent variable. Therefore, the percentage effect is given as 100・{exp(C)-1)}.  








Low-skilled workers Medium-skilled workers High-skilled workers 
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controlling for various observable individual characteristics— decreased during this period in Chile 
(see Fig. 2). Most findings observed in LACs, including those of Attanasio et al. (2004), and the initial 
reform period in Chile, including Beyer et al. (1999), show that the skill premiums for high-skilled 
workers, that is, a return to tertiary education, is in increasing trend. Therefore, concerning the skill 
premiums for high-skilled workers (henceforth, skill premiums), the aforementioned findings totally 
contradict those of most studies. 
To confirm that the aforementioned trend of skill premiums certainly coincides with that of the 
frequently used inequality indices, the evolution of the variance of the natural logarithm of hourly wage 
and the difference between the 90th and 10th percentiles of the natural logarithm of the hourly wage are 
also shown in Table 4. Attanasio et al. (2004) also use those indices to measure inequality. The trend of 
skill premiums is nearly identical to that of those indices; wage inequality once increased in the mid- or 
late 1990s (i.e., from 1996 to 1998 or from 1994 to 1996), and after 1998 wage inequality decreased; it 
also slightly decreased during the 1992–2006 period. Moreover, I confirm that the aforementioned trend 
coincides with that of official statistics published by authorities, because the estimation of skill 
premiums is limited to salaried workers; that is, self-employed whose wages would be more unequal are 
excluded from this estimation. Table 4 also shows the ratio of the highest-income 20% of households to 
the lowest-income 20% of households (Q5/Q1) as calculated by ECLAC (2008), also using CASEN. 
This calculation also shows Q5/Q1 increased in the mid- or late 1990s (from 1994 to 1998),26 decreased 
after 1998, and slightly decreased from 1994 to 2006 (see Table III.2). Moreover, some studies also 
mention this decreasing trend in wage inequality, especially after 2000: Ffrench-Davis (2008; 2010) 
points out that this trend was accentuated during the 2000–2006 period.  
 
TABLE 3 
FIRST-STAGE ESTIMATIONS: RESULTS OF WAGE EQUATION, 1992–2006 
 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 2006 
Cons 5.8862 *** 6.1015 *** 6.2161 *** 6.2975 *** 6.2591 *** 6.3246 *** 6.4292 *** 
 0.0203  0.0193  0.0234  0.0172  0.0160  0.0159  0.0153  
Mskilled 0.1903 *** 0.1833 *** 0.1754 *** 0.1717 *** 0.1646 *** 0.1579 *** 0.1752 *** 
 0.0084  0.0079  0.0098  0.0069  0.0062  0.0061  0.0059  
Hskilled 0.6292 *** 0.5605 *** 0.5175 *** 0.5507 *** 0.5193 *** 0.4760 *** 0.4610 *** 
 0.0150  0.0139  0.0166  0.0118  0.0107  0.0106  0.0102  
Exp 0.0157 *** 0.0149 *** 0.0140 *** 0.0124 *** 0.0135 *** 0.0128 *** 0.0124 *** 
 0.0009  0.0008  0.0010  0.0007  0.0007  0.0006  0.0006  
Exp2 -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** 
-0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** 
 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
Male 0.1214 *** 0.1423 *** 0.1274 *** 0.1257 *** 0.1219 *** 0.1142 *** 0.1280 *** 
 0.0092  0.0086  0.0102  0.0072  0.0065  0.0062  0.0058  
Head of the household 0.0695 *** 0.0778 *** 0.0987 *** 0.0813 *** 0.0797 *** 0.0758 *** 0.1008 *** 





                                                        
26
  Some studies also point out an increasing trend of wage inequality from 1996 to 1998. See, for example, Raczynski 
and Serrano (2005), Ffrench-Davis (2008; 2010). According to Ffrench-Davis (2010), the worsening wage 
inequality is attributable to the recession, which happened after 1998 and was influenced by the Asian crisis.  
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Table 3 (continued) 
 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 2006 
Married 0.0699 *** 0.0855 *** 0.0785 *** 0.0800 *** 0.0729 *** 0.0806 *** 0.0789 *** 
 0.0074  0.0067  0.0081  0.0057  0.0051  0.0050  0.0049  
Part 0.2987 *** 0.4565 *** 0.5164 *** 0.4479 *** 0.4120 *** 0.3441 *** 0.3054 *** 
 0.0123  0.0110  0.0112  0.0077  0.0069  0.0064  0.0065  
Informal -0.1253 *** -0.1983 *** 
-0.2327 *** -0.2040 *** -0.2410 *** -0.2404 *** -0.2618 *** 




    
          
Establishment with 200 
or more 
0.3308 *** 0.3038 *** 0.2854 *** 0.2444 *** 0.2256 *** 0.2118 *** 0.2414 *** 
 0.0120  0.0112  0.0149  0.0088  0.0080  0.0077  0.0076  
Establishment with 10-
199 people 0.1663 *** 0.1602 *** 0.1509 *** 0.1159 *** 0.1267 *** 0.1293 *** 0.1481 *** 
 0.0089  0.0084  0.0101  0.0074  0.0066  0.0068  0.0068  
Establishment with 6-9 
people 0.0787 *** 0.0889 *** 0.0829 *** 0.0697 *** 0.0762 *** 0.0837 *** 0.0841 *** 
 0.0119  0.0115  0.0120  0.0104  0.0089  0.0093  0.0095  
Occupational dummies     
          
Managers (public offices 
and prívate enterprices) 1.1290 *** 1.0598 *** 1.1843 *** 1.0175 *** 1.0137 *** 1.4528 *** 1.1884 *** 
 0.0294  0.0303  0.0357  0.0254  0.0236  0.0294  0.0288  
Professionals 0.8281 *** 0.8393 *** 0.9143 *** 0.8518 *** 0.8836 *** 0.9612 *** 0.8789 *** 
 0.0188  0.0177  0.0215  0.0155  0.0138  0.0138  0.0138  
Technical workers 0.6368 *** 0.5492 *** 0.6180 *** 0.5291 *** 0.5370 *** 0.5227 *** 0.4400 *** 
 0.0172  0.0152  0.0181  0.0132  0.0121  0.0119  0.0119  
Office workers 0.3994 *** 0.3811 *** 0.3968 *** 0.3084 *** 0.3254 *** 0.2998 *** 0.2341 *** 
 0.0148  0.0135  0.0164  0.0114  0.0104  0.0103  0.0101  
Sales 0.2031 *** 0.2191 *** 0.2038 *** 0.1336 *** 0.1583 *** 0.1402 *** 0.1313 *** 
 0.0137  0.0128  0.0152  0.0107  0.0097  0.0098  0.0093  
Agricultural and skilled 
workers 0.0759 *** 0.1142 *** 0.0680 *** 0.0987 *** 0.0698 *** 0.0662 *** 0.0900 *** 
 0.0144  0.0145  0.0181  0.0127  0.0087  0.0093  0.0090  
Craft-workers 0.1754 *** 0.1980 *** 0.1651 *** 0.1608 *** 0.1504 *** 0.1324 *** 0.1533 *** 
 0.0117  0.0110  0.0138  0.0101  0.0092  0.0089  0.0087  
Factory-workers 0.1524 *** 0.1793 *** 0.1989 *** 0.1415 *** 0.1509 *** 0.1576 *** 0.1768 *** 
 0.0135  0.0118  0.0148  0.0108  0.0094  0.0094  0.0088  
Regional dummies     
          
Regional I urban -0.0437 ** -0.1159 *** 
-0.1605 *** -0.0982 *** -0.1139 *** -0.1190 *** -0.0835 *** 
 0.0210  0.0229  0.0285  0.0225  0.0195  0.0189  0.0206  
Region I rural -0.1520 *** -0.1205 *** 
-0.1903 *** -0.1295 *** -0.1480 *** -0.2443 *** -0.2097 *** 
 0.0388  0.0425  0.0516  0.0229  0.0228  0.0227  0.0274  
(continues) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 2006 
Region II urban -0.0397 ** -0.1420 *** 0.0272   0.0029   0.0315 * -0.0137   0.0561 *** 
 0.0174  0.0159  0.0245  0.0199  0.0173  0.0171  0.0158  
Region II rural -0.0292  -0.2020 *** 
-0.2094 *** -0.0077   -0.1047 *** 0.0080   -0.0212   
 0.0359  0.0386  0.0358  0.0311  0.0262  0.0301  0.0255  
Region III urban -0.0585 *** -0.2577 *** 
-0.2112 *** -0.1360 *** -0.1201 *** -0.0837 *** 0.0036   
 0.0185  0.0186  0.0275  0.0173  0.0169  0.0169  0.0167  
Region III rural -0.1724 *** -0.2926 *** 
-0.2564 *** -0.1845 *** -0.1272 *** -0.0688 *** 0.0371  
 0.0331  0.0347  0.0362  0.0250  0.0230  0.0250  0.0227  
Region IV urban -0.2331 *** -0.2883 *** 
-0.2954 *** -0.2145 *** -0.1792 *** -0.1905 *** -0.1515 *** 
 0.0234  0.0172  0.0215  0.0153  0.0162  0.0150  0.0151  
Region IV rural -0.2533 *** -0.3398 *** 
-0.4029 *** -0.2347 *** -0.2094 *** -0.2202 *** -0.1473 *** 
 0.0300  0.0187  0.0309  0.0164  0.0176  0.0163  0.0165  
Region V urban -0.1528 *** -0.1440 *** 
-0.1827 *** -0.1411 *** -0.1257 *** -0.1161 *** -0.1006 *** 
 0.0148  0.0110  0.0137  0.0090  0.0096  0.0090  0.0086  
Region V rural -0.0984 *** -0.1794 *** 
-0.1911 *** -0.2052 *** -0.1379 *** -0.1193 *** -0.0969 *** 
 0.0250  0.0174  0.0254  0.0147  0.0158  0.0146  0.0141  
Region VI urban -0.1484 *** -0.1669 *** 
-0.2323 *** -0.1974 *** -0.1315 *** -0.1330 *** -0.1069 *** 
 0.0187  0.0211  0.0162  0.0128  0.0118  0.0120  0.0103  
Region VI rural -0.1611 *** -0.2071 *** 
-0.2131 *** -0.2051 *** -0.1368 *** -0.1113 *** -0.1319 *** 
 0.0214  0.0257  0.0220  0.0162  0.0126  0.0154  0.0109  
Region VII urban -0.1987 *** -0.3116 *** 
-0.3568 *** -0.2178 *** -0.1927 *** -0.2034 *** -0.2018 *** 
 0.0183  0.0145  0.0175  0.0137  0.0119  0.0114  0.0119  
Region VII rural -0.2384 *** -0.3193 *** 
-0.3651 *** -0.2806 *** -0.2188 *** -0.2082 *** -0.1757 *** 
 0.0230  0.0143  0.0233  0.0189  0.0114  0.0116  0.0114  
Region VIII urban -0.2964 *** -0.3777 *** 
-0.3473 *** -0.2528 *** -0.2271 *** -0.2141 *** -0.2063 *** 
 0.0116  0.0112  0.0139  0.0101  0.0089  0.0088  0.0087  
Region VIII rural -0.3187 *** -0.4450 *** 
-0.5112 *** -0.2866 *** -0.3433 *** -0.3428 *** -0.3254 *** 
 0.0134  0.0135  0.0262  0.0191  0.0116  0.0121  0.0119  
Region IX urban -0.2316 *** -0.1918 *** 
-0.4132 *** -0.2859 *** -0.2634 *** -0.2646 *** -0.2175 *** 
 0.0198  0.0222  0.0168  0.0139  0.0118  0.0114  0.0117  
Region IX rural -0.2641 *** -0.2428 *** 
-0.4519 *** -0.3017 *** -0.2642 *** -0.2895 *** -0.2429 *** 
 0.0285  0.0326  0.0259  0.0198  0.0148  0.0149  0.0151  
Region X urban -0.2021 *** -0.2252 *** 
-0.2807 *** -0.2552 *** -0.2094 *** -0.1791 *** -0.1316 *** 
 0.0187  0.0180  0.0192  0.0161  0.0126  0.0106  0.0106  
Region X rural -0.2187 *** -0.2749 *** 
-0.3979 *** -0.2946 *** -0.1955 *** -0.1905 *** -0.1130 *** 
 0.0231  0.0261  0.0330  0.0293  0.0134  0.0124  0.0115  
Region XI urban -0.0614 ** -0.1192 *** 
-0.1137 *** -0.1295 *** -0.0681 *** -0.0087  0.0989 *** 
 0.0311  0.0282  0.0302  0.0240  0.0257  0.0245  0.0239  
Region XI rural -0.1843 *** -0.1876 *** 
-0.2045 *** -0.1654 *** -0.0958 *** -0.0648 * 0.0322  
(continues) 
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Table 3 (concluded) 
 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 2006 
 0.0448  0.0395  0.0423  0.0321  0.0347  0.0357  0.0332  
Region XII urban 0.0776 *** 0.0599 ** 0.0265  0.0051  0.0700 *** 0.0418  0.0644 *** 
 0.0252  0.0300  0.0316  0.0267  0.0251  0.0262  0.0247  
Region XII rural 0.0285  -0.0050  
-0.0221  -0.1189 *** -0.0189  0.0089  0.0905 *** 
 0.0365  0.0312  0.0456  0.0364  0.0357  0.0387  0.0304  
Metropolitan rural -0.0604 *** -0.1581 *** 
-0.0919 *** -0.0714 *** -0.0520 *** -0.0034  -0.0363 *** 
 0.0160  0.0167  0.0272  0.0130  0.0125  0.0128  0.0139  
Industry indicators Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Numbers of obs 31 461  35 056  28,217  40,850  48,882  51,739  58,458  
R-squared 0.5015  0.5220  0.4970  0.5059  0.5162  0.5187  0.4497  
R-squared without 
industry indicators 0.4813  0.5052  0.4797  0.4928  0.5041  0.5039  0.4380  
Variation attributed to 
industry indicators 0.0403  0.0322  0.0348  0.0259  0.0234  0.0285  0.0260  
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from CASEN 
Note: Numbers in italics are standard errors. Industry-specific skill premiums and their standard errors are calculated 
using Haisken-Denew and Schmidt’s (1997) procedure. 




EVOLUTION OF SKILL PREMIUMS, 1992–2006 
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TABLE 4 
EVOLUTION OF WAGE INEQUALITY, 1992–2006 
Year Variance log wage 90-10 Percentile Skill premiums Q5/Q1 
1992 0.6218 1.8738 0.8762 no data 
1994 0.6508 1.9351 0.7516 17.9 
1996 0.7606 2.0202 0.6779 18.6 
1998 0.6399 1.9459 0.7344 19.7 
2000 0.6553 1.9302 0.6808 19.5 
2003 0.6102 1.8608 0.6096 18.4 
2006 0.5921 1.7641 0.5857 15.7 
Source: Indices except for Q5/Q1 are from author’s calculations, based on 
data from CASEN. Q5/Q1 indices are sourced from ECLAC (2008): Table 12. 
Note: Calculated values are weighted using sample weights. 
 
 
C. Industry wage premiums 
As mentioned above, industry wage premiums are captured by the coefficient on the industry 
indicators of equation (1), wp, which shows the part of worker wages that cannot be explained by 
observable workers’ characteristics but can be attributed to workers’ industry affiliation. However, 
this study does not estimate industry wage premiums as deviations from a particular base category; 
instead, industry wage premiums are expressed as deviations from employment-share-weighted 
average wage premiums, and their exact standard errors are calculated by using Haisken-Denew and 
Schmidt’s (1997) restricted least squares procedures.27  The advantages and necessities inherent in the 
calculation are summarized as follows. First, this normalized industry wage premium can be 
interpreted as the proportional difference in wages for a worker in a given industry, relative to an 
average worker in all industries with the same observable characteristics (Attanasio et al. 2004), that 
is, a worker, who is employed in an industry whose normalized industry wage premium is larger than 
zero, earns more than the average wage, given the same observable characteristics. Second, the 
estimated standard errors of industry wage premiums differ widely from industry to industry; thus, it 
is natural in the second-stage estimation that we should put more weight on industries with smaller 
standard errors in industry wage premiums, and vice versa. Therefore, we need to calculate exact 
standard errors to perform weighted least squares in the second-stage estimation.28   
Table 5 reports industry wage premiums from 1992 to 2006. We note some important features 
within the results. First, most of the industry wage premiums are statistically significant at the 10% level, 
and they vary widely across industries in each year; thus, the assumption that labor mobility across 
industries is imperfect because of labor rigidities is likely realistic during this period in Chile. For 
example, if we calculate the average of the estimated industry wage premiums from 2000 to 2006,29 
which is analyzed in the second-stage estimation discussed in the next section, then the metal ore 
mining/other mining sector (ISIC 23/29) has the highest industry wage premium (0.326), while the 
agriculture and hunting sector (ISIC 11) has the lowest industry wage premium (–0.085). In other words, 
a worker who maintains the same observable characteristics and who switches from the agriculture and 
hunting sector to the metal ore mining/other mining sector would experience a 50.1% increase in hourly 
                                                        
27
  Details of how to calculate these are shown in the annex. 
28
  If we estimate industry wage premiums as deviations from a particular base category, we cannot calculate the standard 
error of the omitted base category, and the standard errors depend upon the industry we choose as the base category. 
29
  I limit this calculation to tradable sectors whose industry wage premiums are statistically significant in all three 
periods examined. 
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wage.30 As a general trend, the mining sector, which includes Chilean traditional export goods, shows a 
high industry wage premium, while the agricultural and light manufacturing sectors such as food 
manufacture, textiles, and apparel show low industry wage premiums (see Table 5). 
Second, the time-series and cross-sectional structure of industry wage premiums did not change 
substantially during the 1992–2006 period in Chile, although applied tariffs substantially decreased after 
2000. The year-to-year correlations among the industry wage premiums of tradable sectors are substantially 
high, with all correlation coefficients exceeding 0.62 and statistical significance occurring at the 1% level 
(see Table 6). These findings coincide with those of Pavcnik et al. (2004), who analyze the case of Brazil 
from 1987 to 1998, but they contradict those of Attanasio et al. (2004), who analyze the case of Colombia 
from 1984 to 1998.31 The standard deviations of the industry wage premium differentials of the tradable 
sectors within the same year, as reported at the bottom of Table 5, fluctuated from 0.088 to 0.124; thus, 
they show little change. Therefore, the cross-sectional structure of the industry wage premiums is also 
relatively stable. This evidence suggests that trade liberalization is not likely to be associated with changes 
in industry wage premiums, which are analyzed in greater detail in the next section. 
Finally, I find that industry wage premiums tend to be lower in industries that employ higher 
shares of low-skilled workers. Therefore, changes in industry wage premiums would also translate into 
changes in the relative incomes of high-skilled and low-skilled workers in the case of Chile. 32  The 
correlation coefficients of the industry wage premiums with the shares of low-skilled workers in tradable 
sectors are certainly negative, ranging from -0.585 in 1998 to -0.236 in 1992. If I pool industry wage 
premiums over time and regress them on the share of low-skilled workers, it yields a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient of -0.2807 (with a T-statistic of -5.34). Therefore, industry wage 
premiums tend to be lower in industries that employ higher shares of low-skilled workers,33 such as the 
agriculture and hunting sector (ISIC 11), the forestry and logging sector (ISIC 12), the fishing sector (ISIC 
13), and the wood-products manufacturing sector (ISIC 331). On the other hand, the mining sector, which 
has the highest average industry wage premium between 2000 and 2006, drastically decreased its share of 
low-skilled workers (see Table 7). Therefore, there is considerable heterogeneity across a variety of natural 
resource-related sectors with respect to the employment share of low-skilled workers.34 
 
TABLE 5 
FIRST-STAGE ESTIMATIONS: INDUSTRY WAGE PREMIUMS, 1992–2006 
ISIC 
(Rev.2) Industry 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 2006 
11 Agriculture and hunting -0.041 *** -0.067 *** -0.120 *** -0.076 *** -0.077 *** -0.103 *** -0.074 *** 
  0.010  0.009  0.012  0.008  0.007  0.007  0.006  
12 Forestry and logging  0.124 *** 0.046 *** 0.014   -0.005   -0.014   -0.033 ** -0.023 * 
  0.017  0.018  0.026  0.020  0.013  0.013  0.013  




                                                        
30
  The value is calculated by exp{0.326 – (–0.085)}– 1. 
31
  In the case of Attanasio et al. (2004), year-to-year correlations in industry wage premiums are as low as 0.14. 
32
  The skill category is defined in the third section. 
33
  However, this tendency is not as evident as in Brazil (Pavcnik et al. 2004). 
34
  In some studies, for example, Leamer et al. (1999), the argument is that natural resource-related sectors, especially 
tropical crops and raw materials, are complementary to capital; thus, natural resource abundance increases inequality 
of LACs. However, Perry and Olarreaga (2006) show that net mining exports tend to correlate positively with the 
capital–unskilled labor ratio in LACs, while net food exports correlate negatively with that ratio. Therefore, while 
taking into consideration that Chilean agricultural products derive from temperate rather than tropical crops, the 
finding that the agricultural sector employs a higher share of low-skilled workers is not surprising. 
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    Table 5 (continued) 
ISIC 
(Rev.2) Industry 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 2006 
  0.025  0.024  0.032  0.026  0.018  0.018  0.018  
21/22 
Coal mining/Crude 
petroleum and natural 
gas production 
0.145 *** 0.101 ** 0.092   0.091   0.131 ** -0.022   0.290 *** 
  0.041  0.051  0.065  0.072  0.063  0.097  0.085  
23/ 
29 
Metal ore mining/ 
Other mining  0.375 *** 0.340 *** 0.370 *** 0.253 *** 0.342 *** 0.351 *** 0.286 *** 
  0.018  0.017  0.023  0.017  0.016  0.016  0.014  
311/ 
312 Food manufacture -0.034 ** -0.021   -0.059 *** -0.051 *** -0.050 *** -0.072 *** -0.050 *** 




Tobacco manufacture 0.019   -0.002   0.076 * 0.042   -0.031   -0.035   0.013   





wearing apparel, except 
footwear 
0.011   -0.027   -0.067 ** 0.001   -0.053 ** -0.056 ** -0.105 *** 
  0.021  0.023  0.028  0.023  0.022  0.025  0.026  
323/ 
324 
Manufacture of leather 
and products of 
leather/Manufacture of 
footwear 
-0.015   -0.099 ** -0.003   -0.036   -0.051   -0.058   -0.159 *** 
  0.036  0.040  0.052  0.038  0.040  0.049  0.058  
331 
Manufacture of wood 
and wood and cork 
products 
0.064 ** -0.019   0.061 ** -0.022   -0.047 ** -0.023   -0.022   
  0.027  0.023  0.030  0.026  0.020  0.019  0.019  
332 Manufacture of furniture and fixtures -0.022   0.028   -0.006   -0.020   -0.019   -0.006   0.006   
  0.040  0.037  0.043  0.031  0.032  0.030  0.032  
341 Manufacture of paper 
and paper products 0.188 *** 0.276 *** 0.224 *** 0.195 *** 0.148 *** 0.136 *** 0.131 *** 
  0.041  0.035  0.052  0.039  0.036  0.033  0.029  
342 Printing, publishing and 
allied industries 0.113 *** 0.104 *** 0.112 ** 0.016   0.038   0.066 ** 0.052   
  0.042  0.039  0.045  0.034  0.037  0.031  0.034  
351 Manufacture of industrial chemicals 0.196 *** 0.100   -0.099   0.114 * 0.132 ** 0.045   0.141 ** 
  0.061  0.074  0.102  0.060  0.067  0.059  0.064  
352 Manufacture of other 
chemical products 0.112 *** 0.150 *** 0.261 *** 0.134 *** 0.219 *** 0.209 *** 0.115 *** 








products of petroleum/ 
Manufacture of rubber 
products/Manufacture of 
plastic products 
0.072 * 0.044   0.057   0.037   0.008   -0.033   -0.047 * 
  0.043  0.047  0.050  0.033  0.036  0.034  0.025  
(continues) 
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   Table 5 (continued) 
ISIC 





products of petroleum 
and coal 
0.129 *** 0.107 *** 0.012   0.118 *** 0.025   0.039   0.056   
  0.035  0.036  0.046  0.035  0.032  0.033  0.035  
37 Basic metal industries  0.164 *** 0.137 *** 0.117 ** 0.112 *** 0.194 *** 0.207 *** 0.201 *** 









of professional and 
scientific and measuring 
controlling equipment 
0.089 *** 0.106 *** 0.065 ** 0.092 *** 0.091 *** 0.109 *** 0.119 *** 





0.170 *** 0.027   0.238 *** 0.169 ** 0.196 *** 0.212 *** 0.136 *** 
  0.062  0.064  0.081  0.067  0.050  0.041  0.031  
384 Manufacture of transport equipment 0.251 *** 0.142 * 0.171 * 0.130 * 0.083   -0.053   0.033   
  0.058  0.076  0.088  0.067  0.053  0.050  0.058  
39 Other manufacture industries  -0.176 *** 0.150 ** 0.054   -0.049   0.152 * -0.131   0.011   
  0.067  0.064  0.133  0.124  0.087  0.089  0.093  
41 Electricity, gas and 
steam 0.287 *** 0.221 *** 0.338 *** 0.187 *** 0.148 *** 0.216 *** 0.087 *** 
  0.045  0.033  0.048  0.029  0.031  0.034  0.031  
42 Water works and supply 0.066   0.078   0.122 * 0.034   0.087 ** 0.034   0.026   
  0.059  0.048  0.063  0.045  0.036  0.038  0.036  
50 Construction 0.095 *** 0.103 *** 0.080 *** 0.076 *** 0.039 *** 0.045 *** 0.053 *** 
  0.012  0.011  0.013  0.009  0.009  0.009  0.008  
61 Wholesale trade 0.078 *** 0.069 *** 0.054 * 0.016   0.047 *** -0.027   0.014   
  0.024  0.026  0.027  0.017  0.017  0.018  0.023  
62 Retail trade -0.059 *** -0.054 *** -0.069 *** -0.057 *** -0.054 *** -0.086 *** -0.054 *** 
  0.013  0.011  0.013  0.009  0.009  0.008  0.008  
63 Restaurants and hotels -0.119 *** -0.101 *** -0.141 *** -0.135 *** -0.106 *** -0.066 *** -0.034 *** 
  0.022  0.019  0.023  0.016  0.014  0.013  0.012  
71 Transport and storage 0.079 *** 0.016   0.001   -0.021 * -0.042 *** -0.029 *** 0.000   
  0.014  0.013  0.016  0.012  0.011  0.010  0.010  
72 Communication 0.130 *** 0.116 *** 0.100 *** 0.144 *** 0.035   -0.013   0.013   
  0.034  0.032  0.038  0.025  0.023  0.025  0.024  
81 Financial institutions 0.441 *** 0.346 *** 0.372 *** 0.306 *** 0.241 *** 0.339 *** 0.290 *** 
  0.030  0.028  0.030  0.023  0.023  0.025  0.024  
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    Table 5 (concluded) 
ISIC 
(Rev.2) Industry 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 2006 
  0.041  0.035  0.040  0.037  0.033  0.035  0.040  
83 Real estate and business 
services 0.097 *** 0.080 *** 0.117 *** 0.069 *** 0.055 *** 0.060 *** 0.071 *** 
  0.023  0.020  0.022  0.015  0.013  0.013  0.011  
91 Public administration 
and defence -0.055 *** 0.037 ** 0.111 *** 0.026 * 0.002   0.033 *** 0.011   
  0.020  0.017  0.022  0.014  0.011  0.012  0.012  
92 Sanitary and similar 
services -0.050   -0.057   -0.162 *** -0.093 *** -0.033   -0.065 *** -0.053 ** 
  0.044  0.041  0.044  0.031  0.026  0.023  0.024  
93 Social and related 
community services -0.179 *** -0.172 *** -0.132 *** -0.114 *** -0.079 *** -0.057 *** -0.087 *** 
  0.011  0.010  0.012  0.008  0.007  0.007  0.007  
94 Recreational and 
cultural services -0.007   -0.027   -0.067 * -0.037   -0.010   0.022   -0.019   
  0.033  0.030  0.036  0.026  0.025  0.022  0.022  
95 Personal and household 
services -0.098 *** -0.018 * -0.009   0.033 *** 0.033 *** 0.057 *** 0.035 *** 
  0.011  0.010  0.013  0.009  0.009  0.009  0.009  
96 International and other 
extra-territorial bodies 0.459 *** 0.352 ** 0.386 * 0.502 *** 0.842 *** 0.510 *** 0.375 *** 
  0.158  0.155  0.198  0.142  0.157  0.177  0.138  
Standard deviation  
(only tradable sectors) 0.117  0.104  0.123  0.088  0.111  0.124  0.117  
Standard deviation 
(all sectors) 0.147  0.122  0.144  0.124  0.163  0.143  0.117  
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from CASEN 
Note: Numbers in italics are standard errors. Industry-specific skill premiums and their standard errors are calculated 
using Haisken-Denew and Schmidt’s (1997) procedure. 




YEAR-TO-YEAR CORRELATION MATRIX OF INDUSTRY  
WAGE PREMIUMS, 1992–2006 
 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 2006 
1992 1.0000 0.6409 0.6386 0.8678 0.6245 0.7255 0.6896 
1994 0.6409 1.0000 0.7149 0.7809 0.8360 0.6394 0.7460 
1996 0.6386 0.7149 1.0000 0.7665 0.7788 0.7733 0.6331 
1998 0.8678 0.7809 0.7665 1.0000 0.8163 0.8169 0.7841 
2000 0.6245 0.8360 0.7788 0.8163 1.0000 0.7912 0.8414 
2003 0.7255 0.6394 0.7733 0.8169 0.7912 1.0000 0.7301 
2006 0.6896 0.7460 0.6331 0.7841 0.8414 0.7301 1.0000 
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TABLE 7 
EVOLUTION OF THE SHARE OF LOW-SKILLED WORKERS  
IN EACH INDUSTRY EMPLOYMENT 
ISIC (Rev.2) Industry 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 2006 
11 Agriculture and hunting 0.7624 0.7378 0.7400 0.7290 0.6980 0.6424 0.5877 
12 Forestry and logging  0.6207 0.6399 0.5651 0.5448 0.5984 0.5516 0.5253 
13 Fishing  0.4155 0.4178 0.4709 0.3501 0.4360 0.4463 0.4070 
21/22 Coal mining/Crude petroleum and natural gas production 0.4577 0.2544 0.2754 0.1776 0.2169 0.2308 0.1382 
23/29 Metal ore mining/Other mining  0.3201 0.2327 0.2298 0.2200 0.1455 0.1466 0.1799 
311/312 Food manufacture 0.3494 0.3281 0.3330 0.2585 0.2791 0.2389 0.2102 
313/314 Beverage industries/Tobacco manufacture 0.3522 0.2759 0.2792 0.2290 0.2983 0.2381 0.1873 
321/322 Manufacture of textiles/Manufacture of wearing 
apparel, except footwear 0.3537 0.3085 0.2206 0.2203 0.2430 0.2073 0.2505 
323/324 Manufacture of leather and products of leather/Manufacture of footwear 0.3845 0.3895 0.3418 0.2619 0.2216 0.2213 0.1947 
331 Manufacture of wood and wood and cork products 0.5169 0.5467 0.4660 0.5020 0.3933 0.4625 0.3731 
332 Manufacture of furniture and fixtures 0.3775 0.3430 0.4439 0.3467 0.2376 0.2506 0.2526 
341 Manufacture of paper and paper products 0.2222 0.2956 0.2680 0.1569 0.1366 0.1038 0.1786 
342 Printing, publishing and allied industries 0.1718 0.1636 0.1852 0.1402 0.1161 0.0971 0.0872 
351 Manufacture of industrial chemicals 0.1946 0.1885 0.1534 0.1711 0.2082 0.1911 0.1164 
352 Manufacture of other chemical products 0.1461 0.0959 0.1504 0.0968 0.0718 0.1404 0.1385 
353/354/ 
355/356 
Petroleum refineries/Manufacture of miscellaneous 
products of petroleum/Manufacture of rubber 
products/Manufacture of plastic products 
0.2683 0.2672 0.2799 0.2274 0.1850 0.1890 0.2378 
36 Manufacture of nonmetallic mineral products, except products of petroleum and coal 0.4401 0.2965 0.3470 0.3640 0.2622 0.4115 0.3496 
37 Basic metal industries  0.3811 0.2306 0.1475 0.1242 0.2042 0.1520 0.1612 
381/383/385 
Manufacture of fabricated metal 
products/Manufacture of electrical machinery 
apparatus/Manufacture of professional and scientific 
and measuring controlling equipment 
0.2109 0.2350 0.2312 0.2374 0.1754 0.1908 0.1773 
382 Manufacture of machinery except electrical 0.1180 0.0652 0.1104 0.0852 0.1521 0.0655 0.0981 
384 Manufacture of transport equipment 0.1940 0.1406 0.0841 0.0845 0.1216 0.1805 0.1962 
39 Other manufacture industries  0.2081 0.1635 0.0443 0.2556 0.0550 0.2068 0.1316 
41 Electricity, gas and steam 0.1961 0.1485 0.0652 0.2082 0.1091 0.0869 0.0979 
42 Water works and supply 0.2721 0.2794 0.1641 0.1848 0.1749 0.2666 0.1788 
50 Construction 0.4947 0.4562 0.4705 0.3917 0.3819 0.3499 0.3281 
61 Wholesale trade 0.2104 0.1622 0.2132 0.1871 0.2336 0.1444 0.1137 
62 Retail trade 0.2106 0.1654 0.1449 0.1583 0.1304 0.1158 0.0896 
63 Restaurants and hotels 0.3736 0.3052 0.2584 0.2690 0.2385 0.2155 0.1934 
71 Transport and storage 0.3152 0.2474 0.2791 0.2589 0.2451 0.2196 0.2019 
72 Communication 0.1557 0.0795 0.0453 0.0941 0.0274 0.0273 0.0261 
81 Financial institutions 0.0257 0.0243 0.0100 0.0140 0.0085 0.0119 0.0147 
82 Insurance 0.0251 0.0088 0.0135 0.0165 0.0271 0.0150 0.0112 
83 Real estate and business services 0.1014 0.0671 0.0808 0.1247 0.0879 0.0690 0.0927 
91 Public administration and defence 0.1894 0.1151 0.1411 0.1068 0.1656 0.1169 0.1098 
92 Sanitary and similar services 0.4731 0.4513 0.4951 0.3683 0.4574 0.3565 0.4610 
93 Social and related community services 0.1181 0.0885 0.0968 0.0944 0.0723 0.0623 0.0546 
94 Recreational and cultural services 0.2335 0.1888 0.2980 0.1881 0.1397 0.0894 0.1068 
95 Personal and household services 0.5690 0.5427 0.5190 0.5127 0.4540 0.4460 0.4383 
96 International and other extra-territorial bodies 0.1711 0.0582 0.0865 0.0460 0.0000 0.0000 0.0266 
all sectors  0.3716 0.3110 0.3117 0.2912 0.2627 0.2459 0.2326 
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from CASEN 
Note: The calculated values are weighted using sample weights. 
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IV. Impacts of trade policy on wage inequality 
(second-stage estimation) 
A. Industry wage premiums and tariffs 
In this section, I econometrically analyze the relationship between trade liberalization and wage 
equalization as shown in the previous sections, through a channel in which tariffs would affect 
industry wage premiums. However, the limited data availability vis-à-vis applied tariffs makes it 
impossible to analyze the full period after 1992; therefore, I limit the analysis to the 2000–2006 period 
and use applied tariffs data from Q2 2000 for 2000, that from Q2 2003 for 2003, and that from Q4 
2005 for 2006. 
Studies that show that trade liberalization contributes to increases in wage inequality, through 
a channel in which tariffs would affect industry wage premiums, assume the following logic chain.  
(i) In the first stage, these studies estimate industry wage premiums from the standard Mincerian wage 
equation and show that industry wage premiums tend to be lower in industries that employ higher 
shares of low-skilled workers. (ii) Industries that experienced larger tariff reductions were those with 
initially higher shares of low-skilled workers and lower industry wage premiums. (iii) In the second-
stage estimation, these studies show there is a statistically significant positive relationship between 
tariff reductions and declines in industry wage premiums. (iv) Therefore, wages in industries with 
initially lower wages and higher shares of low-skilled workers declined relative to economy-wide 
average wages; thus, tariff reductions contribute to an increase in wage inequality. The current study 
has already shown (i); however, unlike the aforementioned studies, in the current study, wage 
inequality tends to decrease. Therefore, to show that trade liberalization would contribute to wage 
equalization through a channel in which tariffs would affect industry wage premiums, we assume the 
following procedures as analogous to (ii) and (iii). If industries that experienced larger tariff 
reductions were those with initially higher industry wage premiums, that is, a regression of tariff 
reductions on initial wage premiums yields a positive coefficient, the positive coefficient of industry 
wage premiums on tariffs is the “correct” sign in the second-stage estimation. On the other hand, if 
industries that experienced larger tariff reductions were those with initially lower industry wage 
premiums, that is, a regression of tariff reductions on initial wage premiums yields a negative 
coefficient, the negative coefficient of industry wage premiums on tariffs is the “correct” sign in the 
second-stage estimation. Therefore, we need to show the protection pattern prior to the tariff 
reductions, before performing the second-stage estimation. 
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In this context, I review a possible theoretical assumption vis-à-vis the association between 
tariffs and industry wage premiums. First of all, the most natural point of departure for thinking about 
the effects of tariffs on industry wage premiums is the specific factors model (Attanasio et al. 2004). 
This model is short-term by nature, as it considers factors of production immobile across industries 
(Attanasio et al. 2004; Pavcnik et al. 2003). According to the simple prediction made via the specific 
factor model, sectors that experienced relatively large tariff reductions, that is, larger declines in their 
prices, will see a decline in the returns to specific factors, relative to those of the economy-wide 
average. Therefore, this model predicts a positive association between tariffs and industry wage 
premiums. Second, Pavcnik et al. (2003) and Feliciano (2001) each point out that trade polices 
including tariffs and NTBs would generate industry rents. Therefore, the tariff reductions would 
decrease industry rents, because trade liberalization likely lowers the profit margins of domestic firms 
that were previously sheltered from foreign competition (Pavcnik et al. 2003); they also predict a 
positive association between tariffs and industry wage premiums. 
On the other hand, a negative association between tariffs and industry wage premiums can 
also be assumed. Empirical studies find strong evidence that decreases in tariffs are associated with 
productivity improvements.35 As tariffs declined, firms had to become more productive to remain 
competitive. If the productivity enhancements had been partially passed onto workers through higher 
industry wages, wages would increase in the industries with the largest tariff reductions (Pavcnik et al. 
2003). Therefore, the aforementioned channel assumes a negative association between tariffs and 
industry wage premiums. 
Fig. 3 plots the tariff reductions between 2000 and 2005 against the industry wage premiums 
in the first year of my sample, 2000. A regression of the tariff reductions between 2000 and 2005 on 
the industry wage premiums of 2000 yields a coefficient of -7.23, but it is not statistically significant 
at 10% (p-value: 0.149). However, if we follow the aforementioned logic chain, a negative coefficient 
of industry wage premiums on tariffs is the “correct” sign. 
Moreover, what is relevant in terms of the objective of this study is the protection pattern 
prior to the trade liberalization of natural resource-related sectors. Although I point out that if natural 
resource-related sectors had been included, the protection pattern prior to the trade liberalization could 
have been changed, the current study’s findings show that the agriculture and hunting sector (ISIC 11) 
was precisely the sector that initially had the highest applied tariffs. This was owing to the existence 
of many kinds of exceptions allowed by tariff phase-out programs, as discussed in the second section, 
and thus, that industry experienced the largest tariff reductions (see again Table 2). Moreover, this 
sector employed the highest share of low-skilled workers and thus had the lowest industry wage 
premiums. Therefore, if various sectors of its economy, including natural resource-related ones, are 
included, it becomes clear that the protection pattern prior to the trade liberalization had not changed, 
that is, industries that experienced larger tariff reductions were those with initially lower industry 
wage premiums, during the 2000–2006 period in Chile. This has also been shown to be the case with 
Colombia from 1984 to 1998 (Attanasio et al. 2004), although there, this tendency among tradable 
sectors was not entirely evident. 
 
  
                                                        
35
  In the specific case of Chile, Pavcnik (2002) finds that there are significant within-plant productivity 
improvements in import-competing industries from 1979 to 1986. 
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FIGURE 3 
TARIFF REDUCTIONS AND INITIAL (2000) WAGE PREMIUMS 
 
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from CASEN and Becerra (2006) 
 
 
The model of the second-stage estimation is as follows: 
 
jtDtTjtjt uYTconswp +′+′+= αα  (2) 
 
where j and t indexes industry and time, respectively, and wp is industry wage premiums. The 
vector T contains industry characteristic-related variables, which include applied tariffs and also other 
controls, such as share of professionals and technical workers in each industry employment, lagged 
exports, and lagged imports.36  The vector Y consists of a set of year indicators. 
I include lagged imports and exports to control the trade-oriented characteristics of each 
industry, that is, whether the industry is export-oriented or import-competing. Although the share of 
exports and imports of the total output of each industry should be used for this purpose, I cannot 
obtain the total output of each industry classified according to at least the 2-digit ISIC level. 
Therefore, I use the absolute values of lagged exports and lagged imports, according to the 
specification of Attanasio et al. (2004). I assume that the common changes across all industries, such 
as macroeconomic shocks, are absorbed by year indicators; I also assume that unobserved time-
invariant industry characteristics are absorbed by industry fixed effects (industry indicators) or 
removed by first differences. 
However, my specification is different from those of the aforementioned studies, that is, 
Pavcnik et al. (2003) and Attanasio et al. (2004), in that it includes the share of professionals and 
technical workers employed in each industry (PTshare). The reasons for this difference are that unlike 
previous studies, this study uses import-weighted average applied tariffs instead of MFN tariffs, as 
discussed in the second section; this could possibly cause endogeneity problems. The problem stems 
from the fact that applied tariffs are weighted by import origins, because each industry can change its 
                                                        
36
  Values are expressed as US$100,000, at current prices. Because trade flows are arguably endogenous, I include the 
first lags of exports and imports measures, rather than their current values (Attanasio et al. 2004). 
y = -7.2976x + 5.4236 
(T-statistics: -1.50) 
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import origins according to which have lower tariffs as a result of PTAs, and because the import 
origins of a industry can correlate with skill intensity in that sector. Furthermore, the skill intensity in 
each industry can also correlate with its industry wage premium, because we can assume an industry 
with more demand for skilled workers tends to offer higher wages. Therefore, applied tariffs can be an 
endogenous variable. The simple solution for this problem is to control for skill intensity in each 
industry; however, if we use the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers in each industry as the skill-
intensity value, the ratio is also an endogenous variable. Although the problem that it is still an 
endogenous outcome variable rather than exogenous technological shocks persists (Goldberg and 
Pavcnik, 2007), PTshare is a more appropriate variable for skill intensity. 
An additional concern vis-à-vis the endogeneity of applied tariffs can derive from political 
context, because it is likely that tariff phase-out programs are influenced by some kind of political 
power, such as industry lobbying. If such kinds of industry lobbying constitute time-varying industry 
characteristics and they also correlate with industry wage premiums, the results will be biased. To 
perform a Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for endogeneity, I use presample applied tariffs (Q1 2000) 
interacted with the MFN tariffs in each year as the instrumental variable. 37  The MFN tariffs in each 
year are flat in the case of Chile, as discussed in the second section, and thus they are exogenously 
determined with respect to industry wage premiums. Moreover, both applied tariffs and MFN tariffs 
show a decreasing trend during the 2000–2005 period (see Table 2), and thus presample applied tariffs 
interacted with the MFN tariff in each year highly correlate with applied tariffs.38  Therefore, they 
may be good instrumental variables for applied tariffs. 
In estimating equation (2), I perform not only panel data analysis but also weighted least 
squares (WLS), because the dependent variable is estimated. When performing WLS, I use the inverse 
of the exact standard errors of industry wage premiums, calculated by using in the first stage Haisken-
Denew and Schmidt’s (1997) restricted least squares procedures as the weights. This procedure puts 
more weight on industries with smaller standard errors in industry wage premiums39 I perform a 
model specification test, that is, the Hausman test, Breusch-Pagan test, and F test in the case of panel 
data analysis, while I perform an F test for the significance of industry indicators in the case of WLS. 
Table 8 reports the results of estimating equation (2). The results of the panel data analysis are 
presented in columns 1–8, while the results of WLS are presented in columns 9–14. The coefficients 
on applied tariffs are negatively significant in the pooling models (columns 3 and 7) and in the WLS 
models without industry indicators (columns 10 and 13). However, those models are rejected as a 
result of the specification tests. The coefficients on applied tariffs are still negative; thus they show the 
“correct” sign but they are not statistically significant in the fixed-effects models (columns 1 and 5); in 
the WLS models with industry indicators (columns 9 and 12), which are adopted as a result of the 
specification tests; or in the first-differences models (columns 4, 8, 11, and 14). The results show that 
the impacts of applied tariffs on industry wage premiums disappear after controlling for unobservable 
time-invariant industry characteristics. Therefore, the observed negative relationship between applied 
tariffs and industry wage premiums is spurious; that is, unobservable time-invariant industry 
characteristics correlate with both industry wage premiums and applied tariffs. The findings suggest 
that, unlike the aforementioned theoretical assumption, the industries with higher productivity tend to 
have lower applied tariffs and higher wage premiums, rather than that the tariff reductions themselves 
lead to productivity improvements in such a short time-period.  
Concerning other variables, the PTshare coefficients are positively significant in all models; 
these are the expected signs. This suggests that the industries with more demand for skilled workers 
                                                        
37
  Pavcnik et al. (2003) and Attanasio et al. (2004) each use presample tariffs interacted with exchange rate, as the 
instrumental variable. However, this is not an appropriate instrumental variable in our case of Chile, because in the 
2000–2005 period, applied tariffs show a decreasing trend but the exchange rate shows no such trend. Therefore, 
presample applied tariffs interacted with exchange rate do not correlate with applied tariffs. 
38
  A regression of applied tariffs on presample applied tariffs that interact with the MFN tariff yields a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient of 0.120 (with a T-statistic of 10.39).  
39
  In the case of WLS, I assume there to be no serial correlations in the error term of equation (2). 
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tend to offer higher wages. The coefficients on lagged exports and lagged imports are not statistically 
significant, except for the pooling model (columns 7), and the inclusion of these additional controls 
hardly changes the coefficients on applied tariffs. The results of Durbin–Wu–Hausman tests for 
endogeneity show we cannot reject the exogeneity of applied tariffs; the p-value is 0.501 and 0.383 in 
the fixed-effects model and the WLS model with industry indicators, respectively.40  The results are 
not surprising, because the policy-making process has been very technocratic since Chile’s military 
coup d’état, and this situation persists under the center-left coalition government; thus, there seems to 
be little room for industry lobbying in Chile.41 
Overall, I find no statistically significant relationship between applied tariffs and industry 
wage premiums, after controlling for unobservable time-invariant industry characteristics. 42  The 
findings are robust, because my estimations take into account the potential endogeneity of applied 
tariffs, and I perform WLS while putting more weight on industries with smaller exact standard errors 
of industry wage premiums. Moreover, I perform a Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for the endogeneity of 
applied tariffs that would be caused by an omitted time-varying industry characteristic, such as 
industry lobbying. 
B. Industry-specific skill premiums and tariffs 
Although the aforementioned findings show there to be no statistically significant relationship 
between applied tariffs and industry wage premiums after controlling for unobservable time-invariant 
industry characteristics, trade liberalization could still contribute to wage equalization through a 
channel in which applied tariffs affect industry-specific skill premiums. Industry-specific skill 
premiums are defined as the incremental wage premiums that skilled workers earn in an industry, in 
addition to the base industry wage premiums (Pavcnik et al. 2003). Therefore, in the first stage, I 














This model differs from equation (1), in that I add interaction terms between industry 
indicators and high-skilled dummies; thus, the coefficient of interaction terms, swp, captures the 
industry-specific skill premium. 
                                                        
40
  In both cases, PTshare, lagged exports, and lagged imports are included as exogenous variables. 
41
  Concerning the technocratization of policy-making in Chile, see, for example, Silva (1991). 
42
  Another possible method involves combining the repressors in equations (1) and (2) and estimating the relationship 
between applied tariffs and wages directly in one stage, that is, in what Galiani and Porto (2006) call a “stronger 
identification strategy.” However, this method cannot control for individual fixed effects, because this individual-
level data are not panel but repeated cross-section. Moreover, we must drop all observations who are employed in 
non-tradable sectors in each year, and dropping these observations may cause sample-selection bias. Although I 
implement this one-stage estimation, the coefficient on applied tariffs is as small as 0.0048 and not at all 
statistically significant (p-value: 0.405). Therefore, the results also show there to be no statistically significant 










































SECOND-STAGE ESTIMATION: APPLIED TARIFFS AND INDUSTRY WAGE PREMIUMS 
 
 1  2  3  4   5  6  7  8   9  10  11  12  13  14  
Applied tariff -0.0009  -0.0048  -0.0191 *** -0.0015   -0.0013  -0.0062  -0.0142 *** -0.0017  Applied 
tariff 
-0.0008 
 -0.0125 ** -0.0008  -0.0007  -0.0114 ** -0.0007  
 0.0042  0.0041  0.0060  0.0030   0.0042  0.0043  0.0053  0.0027   0.0021  0.0050  0.0021  0.0022  0.0044  0.0022  
PTshare 0.4722 *** 0.5191 *** 0.6474 *** 0.5483 ***  0.4572 *** 0.5250 *** 0.6215 *** 0.5291 *** PTshare 0.4494 *** 0.8626 *** 0.4494 *** 0.4411 *** 0.8235 *** 0.4411 **
* 
 0.0741  0.0732  0.1091  0.0868   0.0758  0.0771  0.0945  0.0682   
0.0821 
   0.0821  0.0859  0.1115  0.0859  
Lagged  
exports 





      -0.000002  0.000002 *** -0.000002  
          0.000005  0.000005  0.000005  0.000005         0.000004  0.000005  -0.000004  
Lagged  
imports 
         0.000014  0.000019  0.000024 *** 0.000022  Lagged 
imports 
      -0.000001  0.000016  -0.000001  
          0.000012  0.000010  0.000009  0.000022         0.000011  0.000011  0.000011  
Year  
indicators 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Year 
indicators 
Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Robust No  No  No  Yes  No   No  No  Yes  Industry 
indicators 
Yes    No  Yes  No  No  
Model Fixed  Random  Pooling  First-differen 
ces 
Fixed   Random  Pooling  First-
differences 
  First 
differen 
ces 
No    Yes  No  Yes  
Number of  
obs 
66  66  66  44   66  66  66  44  Weight Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Number of 
 groups 
22  22  22     22  22  22    Number of 
obs 
66    44  66  66  44  
R-squared     0.4843  0.5809       0.6374  0.6026  R-squared 0.9676    0.4126  0.9677  0.6595  0.4166  
within 0.5345  0.5261       0.5516  0.5043       
F test: 
25.71*** 
  F test: 
17.25*** 
  










overall 0.4095  0.4470       0.4149  0.5894      
 Hausman test: 13.31***   Hausman teset: 43.46***   
 Breusch-Pagan test: 30.24***   Breusch-Pagan test: 14.58***   
 F test 11.94***   F test: 7.79***   
Model  
specification 
Fixed   Fixed   
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from CASEN and Becerra (2006) 
Note: Numbers in italics are standard errors. 
*** and ** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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As in the case of industry wage premiums, industry-specific skill premiums are also 
expressed as deviations from the employment-share-weighted average skill premium, and their exact 
standard errors are calculated by using Haisken-Denew and Schmidt’s (1997) restricted least squares 
procedures. This normalized industry-specific skill premium can be interpreted as the proportional 
difference in wages through the channel of industry-specific skill premiums for a high-skilled worker 
in a given industry, relative to average high-skilled workers who have the same observable 
characteristics, across all industries (Pavcnik et al. 2003). That is to say: a worker who is employed in 
an industry whose normalized industry-specific skill wage premium is larger than zero earns more 
than the average wage of a high-skilled worker, given the same observable characteristics. 
The theoretical assumption that trade liberalization contributes to wage equalization through a 
channel in which applied tariffs affect industry-specific skill premiums goes as follows. We assume 
high-skilled workers are less mobile across industries than low- or medium-skilled workers, that is, high-
skilled workers are immobile (specific) factors and low-skilled workers are mobile factors, in the short to 
medium term.43 Under this assumption, wage equalization is exactly what the specific factor model (or 
Ricardo–Viner model) would predict: high-skilled workers, that is, immobile factors employed in 
industries that experience more tariff reductions, will see a greater decline in their wages than those 
employed in industries that experience fewer tariff reductions, and the effects of mobile factors, that is, 
low- or medium-skilled workers, are ambiguous. Therefore, whatever protection patterns exist prior to 
tariff reductions, those reductions would decrease industry-specific skill premiums, and would thus 
contribute to economy-wide wage equalization, as long as we can assume that high-skilled workers are 
less mobile than low- or medium-skilled workers. Thus, the positive coefficient of industry wage 
premiums on tariffs is the expected sign in the second-stage estimation. 
Table 9 reports industry-specific skill premiums from 1992 to 2006, wherein we see some 
important features. First, more than half of all industry-specific skill premiums are statistically 
significant at the 10% level, and they vary widely across industries in each year; thus, one can plausibly 
assume that high-skilled workers were more or less immobile across industries during this period in 
Chile. For example, if we calculate the average of the estimated industry-specific skill premiums from 
2000 to 2006,44 we see that, for example, in the forestry and logging sector (ISIC 12), the highest 
industry wage premium was 0.259, while in the coal mining/crude petroleum and natural gas 
production sector (ISIC 21/22), the lowest industry wage premium was -0.208; therefore, a high-
skilled worker with the same observable characteristics who switched from the coal mining/crude 
petroleum and natural gas production sector to the forestry and logging sector would experience a 
59.5% increase in hourly wage.45 As a general trend, the forestry and forestry-processing industries 
such as paper and paper products, which in Chile are newly growing export sectors, show high 
industry-specific skill-premiums (see Table 9). 
Second, unlike industry wage premiums, the structure of industry-specific skill premiums is 
not stable. The year-to-year correlation coefficients of the industry-specific skill premiums of tradable 
sectors are low: a maximum of 0.614 (between 1992 and 1994) and a minimum of 0.101 (between 
2000 and 2003). Moreover, the standard deviations of industry-specific skill premium differentials 
among tradable sectors within the same year, as reported at the bottom of Table 9, fluctuated from 
0.153 to 0.333; thus, they show substantial change, and the standard deviations in themselves are 
relatively larger than those of industry wage premiums. 
                                                        
43
  Needless to say, we can also assume that low- or medium-skilled workers are less mobile across industries than 
high-skilled workers. It is also a natural assumption that high-skilled workers can easily move across industries, 
because highly educated workers accumulate general, transferable skills. However, if we take into consideration the 
reality of Chile, the assumption that low-skilled workers are mobile seems to be plausible. Raczynski and Serrano 
(2005) point out that an important current characteristic of the poor in Chile is that they are employed in various 
kinds of temporary and precarious economic activities, including those in the agriculture, manufacture, 
construction, and service sectors.  
44
  I limit this calculation to tradable sectors whose industry wage premiums are statistically significant in more than 
two periods, at the least. 
45
  The value is calculated by exp{(0.259 – (–0.208)}– 1. 
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TABLE 9 
FIRST-STAGE ESTIMATIONS: INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC SKILL PREMIUMS, 1992–2006 
ISIC  
(Rev.2) Industry 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2003 2006 
11 Agriculture 
and hunting 
0.168  *** 0.179  *** 0.179  ** 0.068    0.135  *** 0.163  *** 0.069  ** 
  0.057   0.050   0.071   0.045   0.036   0.036   0.030   
12 Forestry and 
logging  
0.101    0.327  *** 0.475  *** 0.257  *** 0.332  *** 0.094    0.352  *** 
  0.095   0.081   0.107   0.078   0.064   0.060   0.082   
13 Fishing  0.097    0.176  ** 0.315  ** -0.028    0.166  ** 0.006    0.157  ** 









0.319  * 0.158    0.279    0.230    0.305  * -1.097  ** 0.169    





r mining  
0.146  *** 0.167  *** 0.131  ** 0.233  *** 0.091  ** 0.142  *** 0.035    





0.224  *** 0.177  *** 0.334  *** 0.029    0.167  *** 0.156  *** -0.001    







-0.049    0.090    0.299  ** 0.290  ** -0.042    0.148  * 0.148  ** 









0.270  *** 0.286  *** 0.162  * 0.170  * 0.405  *** -0.009    0.035    









0.758  *** 0.447    0.255    0.110    -0.194    -0.762  *** 0.591  * 
  0.176   0.312   0.346   0.137   0.162   0.196   0.303   
331 Manufacture 




-0.213  * -0.003    0.182    0.198  * 0.196  ** 0.201  ** 0.220  ** 




0.294    0.260  * 0.565  * -0.191    -0.244  * -0.497  *** 0.187    
  0.210   0.139   0.299   0.132   0.147   0.122   0.117   
341 Manufacture 
of paper and 
paper 
products 
0.493  *** 0.143    -
0.192  
  0.326  *** 0.254  ** 0.170  ** 0.222  *** 





0.125    -0.150    0.018    0.213  ** 0.010    -0.037    -0.142  * 
  0.098   0.129   0.113   0.083   0.093   0.071   0.077   
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Industry 1992  1994  1996  1998  2000  2003  2006  
351 Manufacture of 
industrial 
chemicals 
0.322  ** 0.251    0.011    0.065    0.358  ** -0.124    0.172    
  0.138   0.158   0.222   0.161   0.162   0.149   0.151   
352 Manufacture of 
other chemical 
products 
0.178    0.106    0.302  *** 0.180  ** 0.195  *** 0.229  *** 0.222  ** 











ture of  
rubber 
products/Manufact
ure of plastic 
products 
0.048    0.268  * 0.522  *** 0.377  *** 0.031    0.195  ** 0.017    
  0.163   0.147   0.161   0.108   0.100   0.093   0.087   




petroleum and coal 
0.392  ** 0.331  ** 0.270  * 0.150    0.231  ** 0.047    0.352  **
* 
  0.185   0.139   0.144   0.102   0.103   0.110   0.116   
37 Basic metal 
industries  
0.203    0.123    -0.078    -0.155    0.101    -0.067    0.088    







e of electrical 
machinery 
apparatus/Manufactu





0.049    0.122  * 0.085    0.085    0.041    0.044    -0.153  ** 
  0.076   0.069   0.086   0.067   0.064   0.058   0.064   
382 Manufacture of 
machinery except 
electrical 
-0.053    -0.052    -0.396  ** 0.004    0.229  * 0.067    -0.004    
  0.160   0.201   0.200   0.165   0.119   0.092   0.085   
384 Manufacture of 
transport 
equipment 
0.206    0.021    -0.056    0.078    -0.159    0.174    0.052    
  0.164   0.218   0.243   0.185   0.166   0.130   0.156   
39 Other manufacture 
industries  
-0.106    -0.557  *** 0.165    0.394    0.789  *** -0.092    0.539    
  0.217   0.213   0.370   0.292   0.240   0.267   0.524   
41 Electricity, gas and 
steam 
0.090    0.305  *** 0.231  ** 0.253  *** 0.131  * 0.300  *** -0.074    
  0.103   0.075   0.111   0.077   0.079   0.083   0.074   
42 Water works and 
supply 
0.103    0.390  *** 0.233    0.084    0.128    0.188  * 0.196  * 
  0.169   0.143   0.153   0.127   0.110   0.110   0.106   
50 Construction 0.299  *** 0.228  *** 0.325  *** 0.126  *** 0.136  *** 0.123  *** 0.178  *** 
  0.045   0.043   0.047   0.034   0.032   0.029   0.028   
61 Wholesale trade 0.077    0.309  *** 0.099    0.247  *** 0.205  *** 0.131  *** 0.232  *** 




ECLAC – Project Documents collection Trade policy and wage inequality in Chile since the 1990s 
38 
Table 9 (concluded) 
ISIC  
(Rev.2) 
Industry 1992  1994  1996  1998  2000  2003  2006  
62 Retail trade 0.082  ** 0.085  *** 0.033    0.070  *** 0.038    0.054  ** 0.023    
  0.037   0.033   0.036   0.027   0.024   0.023   0.021   
63 Restaurants 
and hotels 
-0.137    -0.040    -0.010    -0.078    -0.202  *** 0.044    0.075  ** 
  0.091   0.086   0.079   0.051   0.050   0.042   0.037   
71 Transport and 
storage 
0.069    0.165  *** 0.047    0.153  *** 0.113  *** 0.106  *** 0.150  *** 
  0.050   0.050   0.052   0.039   0.037   0.032   0.031   
72 Communication 0.185  ** 0.264  *** 0.208  *** 0.151  *** -0.019    0.237  *** 0.179  *** 
  0.087   0.071   0.080   0.055   0.052   0.052   0.049   
81 Financial 
institutions 
0.051    -0.087    0.000    0.079  * -0.062    0.113  ** 0.064    
  0.061   0.056   0.057   0.045   0.045   0.048   0.046   
82 Insurance -0.109    -0.003    0.039    -0.346  *** -0.147  ** -0.032    -0.106    
  0.082   0.070   0.077   0.073   0.067   0.068   0.079   
83 Real estate and 
business 
services 
0.154  *** 0.115  *** 0.166  *** 0.062  ** 0.048  * 0.000    0.038    




-0.057    0.042    -0.036    -0.030    0.001    0.059  ** 0.081  *** 
  0.044   0.035   0.045   0.029   0.026   0.024   0.024   
92 Sanitary and 
similar services 
0.921  *** 0.170    0.233    0.147    0.082    0.049    0.067    
  0.187   0.207   0.184   0.140   0.140   0.107   0.097   




-0.164  *** -0.163  *** -0.184  *** -0.131  *** -0.101  *** -0.118  *** -0.135  *** 




0.217  ** 0.083    0.086    0.082    -0.028    -0.015    -0.024    
  0.085   0.073   0.090   0.064   0.066   0.051   0.050   
95 Personal and 
household 
services 
-0.082    0.007    0.006    -0.131  *** -0.168  *** -0.119  *** 0.071  * 
  0.065   0.059   0.068   0.047   0.045   0.039   0.042   
96 International and 
other extra-
territorial bodies 
0.833  *** 0.017    0.436    -0.075    0.494    0.529    0.138    
  0.319   0.328   0.418   0.291   0.341   0.408   0.278   
Standard deviation 
(only tradable sectors) 
0.211  0.205  0.229  0.153  0.225  0.333  0.187  
Standard deviation (all 
sectors) 
0.252  0.182  0.199  0.160  0.207  0.276  0.161  
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from CASEN 
Note: Numbers in italics are standard errors. Industry-specific skill premiums and their standard errors are calculated 
using Haisken-Denew and Schmidt’s (1997) procedure. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
As is the case with industry wage premiums, the estimated industry-specific skill premiums, 
swp, are pooled over time and regressed on industry characteristic-related variables, including applied 
tariffs. The specification and estimation method are the same as those of industry wage premiums. 
Table 10 reports the results: the results of panel data analysis are presented in columns 1–8, 
while those of WLS are presented in columns 9–14. The coefficients on applied tariffs are not 
statistically significant in all models. They still have the “correct” (i.e., positive) signs in the pooling 
model (columns 3 and 7), WLS models without industry indicators (columns 10 and 13), which are 
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adopted as a result of the specification tests.46 However, they have the “wrong” (i.e., negative) signs in 
the first-differences models (columns 4, 8, 11, and 14). Therefore, I find no statistically significant 
relationship between applied tariffs and industry-specific skill premiums. 
Concerning other variables, the PTshare coefficients are positively significant, which are the 
expected signs, except for the WLS model with lagged exports and lagged imports. This suggests that 
industries with more demand for high-skilled workers tend to pay them relatively higher wages. The 
coefficients on the lagged imports and lagged exports, except for the pooling model (column 7), are 
not statistically significant. The results of Durbin–Wu–Hausman tests for endogeneity again show that 
we cannot reject the exogeneity of applied tariffs; the p-value is 0.218 and 0.178 in the pooling model 
and the WLS model without industry indicators, respectively.47 Therefore, the findings are also robust 
when one takes into account the potential endogeneity of applied tariffs. 
In summary, I find no statistically significant evidence that trade liberalization in Chile during 
the examined time-period contributed to wage equalization through a channel in which applied tariffs 
affect industry-specific skill premiums. 
                                                        
46
  Unlike in the case of industry wage premiums, the significance of industry fixed effects (industry indicators) is very low. 
47









































SECOND-STAGE ESTIMATION: APPLIED TARIFFS AND INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC  
SKILL PREMIUMS 
 1  2  3  4   5  6  7  8   9  10 11  12  13 14 
Applied 
tariff 
0.0080  0.0191  0.0191  -0.0064   0.0093  0.0176  0.0176  -0.0061  Applied 
tariff 
-0.0030  0.0000 -
0.0030 
 -0.0011  0.0009 -0.0011 
 0.0251  0.0178  0.0175  0.0230   0.0255  0.0179  0.0177  0.0231   0.0142  0.0110 0.0142  0.0144  0.0112 0.0144 
PTshare 1.3633 *** 0.7482 ** 0.6804 ** 2.1980 ***  1.4098 *** 0.8421 *** 0.7825 ** 2.2336 **** PTshare 0.7713 * 0.1450 0.7713 * 0.7806  0.1998 0.7806 
 0.4429  0.3206  0.3161  0.5532   0.4551  0.3217  0.3170  0.5794   0.4536  0.2387 0.4536  0.4699  0.2413 0.4699 
Lagged 
exports 

















          0.000030  0.000016  0.000016  0.000023        0.000019  0.000010 0.000019 
Lagged 
imports 

















          0.000074  0.000031  0.000030  0.000112        0.000063  0.000024 0.000063 
Year 
indicators 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Year 
indicators 
Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Robust No  No  No  Yes  No   No  No  Yes  Industry 
indicators 
Yes  No No  Yes No  No 
Model Fixed  Random  Pooling  First-
differences 






No  No Yes  No No  Yes 
Number of 
obs 
66  66  66     66  66  66  44  Weight Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Number of 
groups 
22  22  22     22  22  22    Number of 
obs 
66  66 44  66  66 44 
R-squared     0.1829         0.2298  0.4918  R-squared 0.4383  0.0505 0.0120  0.4557  0.0865 0.0428 














overall 0.1507  0.1825       0.2024  0.2295      
 Hausman test: 
4.07 
  Hausman test: 
3.42 
  
 Breusch and 
Pagan test: 
0.30 
  Breusch and 
Pagan test: 0.12 
  
 F test: 1.35   F test: 1.18   
Model  
specification 
Pooling   Pooling   
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from CASEN and Becerra (2006). 
Note: Numbers in italics are standard errors. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Conclusions 
This study empirically analyzes the impact of trade liberalization on wage inequality in Chile at a time 
when various sectors of its economy, including natural resource-related ones, during a period in which 
the country had implemented important economic reforms and has continued with its sustained open 
economy strategy. 
As a result of the first-stage estimation, I find wage inequality measured by skill premiums 
for high-skilled workers shows a decreasing trend during the 1992–2006 period; this trend is 
especially evident after 2000, and is quite the opposite of those of other LACs or that of Chile’s initial 
reform period starting in the mid-1970s. Moreover, I confirm that industry wage premiums vary 
widely across industries in each year. However, the findings of the second-stage estimation show that 
there is no statistically significant relationship between applied tariffs and industry wage premiums, 
after controlling for unobservable time-invariant industry characteristics during the 2000–2006 period. 
Moreover, I find no statistically significant relationship between applied tariffs and industry-specific 
skill premiums. Therefore, I find no evidence that bi- or multilateral trade liberalization during the 
period contributed to wage equalization through a channel in which applied tariffs affect industry 
wage premiums. 
The contribution of this study to the literature that empirically analyzes trade and wage 
inequality is summarized as follows. First, this study is one of only a few to focus on tariffs —the 
most direct measures of trade policy— rather than indirect outcome variables such as trade volumes 
(Pavcnik et al. 2003). As pointed out by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001), tariffs are the most direct 
measures of trade policy, and thus, findings of an analysis of the impact of trade liberalization on 
wage inequality using tariffs are more reliable. Moreover, this study is probably the first to analyze 
empirically the impacts of bi- or multilateral trade liberalization on wage inequality while using 
applied tariffs, owing to the preferential margin given under numerous PTAs since the 1990s in Chile.  
Second, the results of econometric analyses show that the unobservable time-invariant 
industry characteristics correlate with both industry wage premiums and applied tariffs. Therefore, the 
findings suggest that, unlike the theoretical assumption that tariff reduction-induced productivity 
improvements lead to increases in industry wage premiums, industries with higher productivity tend to 
have initially lower applied tariffs and higher wage premiums in such a short time-period. 
Third, once again, it is noticeable that none of the previous studies find statistically significant 
effects that trade opening or openness reduces wage inequality in LACs (Perry and Olarreaga, 2006). 
Therefore, while the finding that trade liberalization does not necessarily contribute to an increase in 
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wage inequality —at least since 2000 in Chile— is in itself very important, this study cannot show that 
trade liberalization contributes to wage equalization through a channel in which applied tariffs affect 
industry premiums. Moreover, what is relevant from the viewpoint of comparisons between initial 
liberalization episodes since the mid-1970s subject to across-the-board indiscriminate unilateral opening 
and sustained liberalization episodes since the 1990s subject to reciprocity is that the former had adverse 
effects on wage distribution, but that the latter did not. These findings basically coincide with those of 
Galiani and Porto (2006), who analyze the case of Argentina from 1974 to 2001. They also compare the 
two liberalization episodes of the 1970s and 1990s and find that tariff reductions increased wage 
inequality in both periods. However, those adverse effects were much less marked in the 1990s, when 
tariff reductions were mainly due to the enforcement of MERCOSUR. Those results suggest that tariff 
reductions due to reciprocal PTAs do not necessarily have adverse effects on wage distribution.  
Much work remains to be done. I had to limit the second-stage estimation during the 2000–
2006 period owing to data availability vis-à-vis applied tariffs. If I were to obtain reliable data 
regarding applied tariffs between 1992 and 1998, I could perform the second-stage estimation for the 
whole of the 1992–2006 period. 48  Moreover, other trade characteristic-related variables such as 
foreign direct investment (FDI) may be important determinants of industry wage premiums or 
industry-specific skill premiums. However, in addition to the total output of each industry, I have been 
unable to obtain the FDI of each industry classified according to at least up to the 2-digit ISIC level. If 
I were to perform the second-stage estimation including those variables, I may find another possible 
channel through which trade liberalization has affected wage equalization in Chile since the 1990s. 
Further research needs to be conducted to determine the aforementioned unobservable time-
invariant industry characteristics that correlate with both industry wage premiums and applied tariffs, 
and whether those characteristics relate to the effects of PTAs not captured by traditional trade theory. 
Sala-i-Martin (2009) argues that, among these benefits, perhaps the most important is the transmission 
and coordination of policies and institutions that lead to greater economic efficiency, greater 
productivity, and higher growth rates. Such factors, for example, quality of institution in each 
industry, may constitute part of the aforementioned unobservable time-invariant industry 
characteristics. However, no such empirical analyses were undertaken in this study; this area will be 
an interesting subject of future research. 
                                                        
48
   Applied tariffs from WITS levied in each industrial sector from 1992 to 1998 are not at the homogenous rate of 
11%, though they have few variances, while they are at the homogenous rate of 9% in 2000, as discussed in the 
second section. Therefore, we can at least use the data from WITS as an approximation of applied tariffs. Thefore I 
performe the second stage estimation during the 1992–2006 period using applied tariff data, that is, using data from 
WITS during the 1992–1998 period and data from Becerra (2006) during the 2000–2006 period, as a robustness 
check. The findings as follows. First, regarding industry wage premiums, the coefficients on applied tariffs are 
negatively significant in the pooling models and in the WLS models without industry indicators. However, those 
models are rejected as a result of the specification tests and the significance disappears after controlling for 
unobservable time-invariant industry characteristics. Second, regarding industry-specific skill premiums, the 
coefficients on applied tariffs are not statistically significant in all specifications. Therefore, the findings are 
excactly identical to those of analyzing  the 2000–2006 period; thus the aforementioned fidings may be robust 
when icluding the 1992–1998 period. 
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Calculating industry wage premiums and industry-specific skill 
premiums by using Haisken-Denew and Schmidt’s (1997)  
restricted least squares (RLS) procedures 
We consider the following regression model: 
εβδ ++= XZy  A.1 
 
where y is an n × 1 vector of dependent variable, Z is an n × g matrix of repressors, X is an n × 
(k+1) matrix containing a constant term as its first element, and k dummy variables, that is, industry 
indicators and interaction terms between industry indicators and high-skilled dummies in the case of 
industry wage premiums and industry-specific skill premium, respectively, δ  and β   are g × 1 and (k 
+ 1) × 1 vector, respectively; ε   is an n × 1 vector of random errors. If we include k dummy variables 
in this equation, it necessarily causes multicollinearity. To estimate the coefficients of k dummy 
variables and their exact standard errors, we impose an additional restriction. In this study, the 
coefficients of dummy variables are expressed as deviations from a weighted average; thus, the 
restriction is as follows: 
0=′βw  A.2 
 
where the weights w are captured by ),0( 1 ′= kwww L  and 1=′iw  for )1,,1( ′= Li  w is 
each industry’s share in total employment and the share of the number of high-skilled workers in each 
industry’s employment, weighted by each industry’s share in the case of industry wage premiums and 
industry-specific skill premiums, respectively. 
In order to state the first-order condition for this minimization problem, we make use of the 
following Lagrangian function: 
)()()( βλβδβδ wXZyXZyL ′+−−′−−=  A.3 
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Therefore, we obtain equation (3) of Haisken-Denew and Schmidt (1997). The industry wage 
premiums and their standard errors and industry-specific skill premiums and their standard errors, as 
reported in Tables 5 and 9, respectively, are calculated by using equations (A.8) and (A.10). However, 
2
εσ  is an unknown parameter, and thus I estimate it from the standard error of the OLS estimate of 
equation (A.1), which drops X from one base category. 
